Knowledge and Rules : Hayek's social theorizing in later work by de Souza, Maria Filomena
C
en
tre
 in
te
ru
ni
ve
rs
ita
ire
 d
e 
re
ch
er
ch
e 
su
r l
a 
sc
ie
nc
e 
et
 la
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
e
 
 
 
Note 
de recherche 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge and Rules :  Hayek’s social 
theorizing in later work 
 
 
 
Maria Filomena de Sousa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
02-05 
 
  
  
Pour se procurer des copies de cette note de recherche communiquer avec les chercheurs: 
 
Adresse postale:  CIRST 
   UQAM 
   C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-ville 
   Montréal, Québec 
   Canada, H3C 3P8 
 
Adresse civique: CIRST 
   UQAM 
   Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain , 3e étage 
   455, boul. René-Lévesque Est, Bureau W-3042 
   Montréal, (Québec) Canada 
   H2L 4Y2 
 
Téléphone (secrétariat du CIRST): (514) 987-4018 
Télécopieur (secrétariat du CIRST): (514) 987-7726 
Courrier électronique: CIRST@uqam.ca 
Site Internet: www.cirst.uqam.ca 
 
 
 
Knowledge and Rules: Hayek's social theorizing in later work 
 
Maria Filomena de Sousa 
Université du Québec à Montréal 
 
It is often held that the 'Scientism' essay (1942- 44) is F. von Hayek's most significant 
methodological contribution. It may be asserted, however, that his radically subjectivist social 
theorizing in that essay sets serious questions against the research framework that it proposes. 
Given these difficulties I want to argue that it is appropriate to regard the 'Scientism' essay, and 
the related article 'The Facts of the Social Sciences' (1943), as a mere stage in the evolution of 
Hayek's thinking. Indeed, I believe that Hayek's most significant contributions derive from a 
line of research he launched in the mid-1960s when he moved from technical economics to 
philosophical questions and amended his previous methodological position that was sustained 
by the conceptual couple of constitutive and explanatory ideas, which had constituted the 
backbone of the 'Scientism' essay. At the same time, motivated by the socialist calculation 
debate, Hayek emphatically argued against constructivist rationalism and undertook the positive 
task of setting out a theory of the spontaneous order as the unintended result of human efforts 
and the product of unplanned process of selective evolution. 
In this paper I will offer an account of Hayek's social theorizing as grounded in the 
assumption that social life is rule-governed and that the knowledge upon which social life 
depends is largely tacit. I will conclude by pointing out that in his later work Hayek's 
methodological position which differs considerably from the mainstream Austrian tradition sets 
the stage for a successful challenge to central planning. 
 
Tacit knowledge and rules 
First, it should be emphasized that the various arguments Hayek put forward from the 
1960s onwards rest upon the core assumption that unifies his scientific work of seven decades, 
according to which, knowledge is fragmented, dispersed amongst a myriad of socio-economic 
agents and no individual, i.e. planer, can have access to the totality of the information that 
constitutes it. It ensues that in large organizations it is impossible for individuals to achive 
  
 coordination through explicit rational agreements1. This is a permanent feature of Hayek's work 
and it is inseperable from the scientific demonstration that socialism is not viable. These two 
theses are carried out together and although in the 1930s he had started to focus on the 
epistemological aspect of the problem, it is only from the mid-60s onwards that the challenge to 
central planning becomes more of a philosophical than of an economic kind. 
An important aspect of Hayek's long-held observation about the knowledge upon which 
socio-economic life depends concerns its tacit and practical character. Indeed, these insights are 
decisive for his mature social theorizing and for the development of his arguments on the 
socialist problem. Hayek went on to elaborate upon the notion that much of what people know 
is not available to their conscious reasoning for the first time in his essay of 1945a. As he put 
forward a conception of practical, tacit, knowledge that took inspiration from Michael Polanyi, 
who also opposed central planning, and from Gilbert Ryle. Hayek emphasized that agents are 
unable to conceptualize all the conditions of their actions given that economic knowledge is 
constatntly changing along with whatever changes occur in society. The concept of practical 
tacit knowledge replaces, then, the language of 'opinions' and 'beliefs' that predominated in the 
'Scientism' essay and which usually implies explicit, discursive, knowledge. Incidentally, it is 
also worth noticing that Hayek later emphasized that information is clearly preferable 'to where 
I usually spoke of 'knowledge', since the former clearly refers to the knowledge of particular 
facts rather than theoretical knowledge to which plain 'knowledge' might be thought to refer' 
(Hayek, 1979a, p. xii). 
Even though agents are unable to conceptualize all the conditions of their actions, since 
the most essential informaton is passed on in the prices of commodities as abbreviated signals 
they are able to react in appropriate ways to changes in their circumstances without explicitly 
knowing much about them. Hayek will repeatedly resort to this to justify his claim that 
rationally engineered systems are inferior to the market system in a democratic society. For 
market prices ensure that 'all of a society's dispersed knowledge will be taken into account and 
used', provided that prices be 'determined solely by market forces and not by the coercive 
powers of government' (Hayek, 1978, p. 62). 
                                                 
1  Interestingly enough, Bruce Caldwell (1988) and O'Driscoll (1977) suggested that the coordination problem 
provides the unifying topic for Hayek's work. 
 Most significantly, in 1963a Hayek's ideas on the significance of the use of knowledge in 
society are supplemented by the notion that, as repeated by Hume and Kant, general rules must 
prevail for spontaneity to flourish. Coordination within the spontaneous order is, then, achieved 
not only through the price mechanism but also when people act according to certain rules, 
although individuals will usually be unaware of the rules governing their actions. As a 
consequence, the notion of non-discursive rule-following played a pivotal role in Hayek's social 
theorizing after the mid-1960s. 
 
Social reality as rule-following: Coordination and negative rules 
In order for the process of coordination chacteristic of the market to operate beneficially, 
competition requires that those involved observe rules rather than resort to physical force. Thus, 
rules alone can unite an extended order. As underlined, in a statement typical of the liberal 
tradition: 
 
It is only as a result of individuals observing certain common rules that a group of men 
can live together in those orderly relations which we call a society…No group is likely to 
agree on articulated rules unless its members already hold opinions that coincide in some 
degree. (Hayek, 1973a, p. 95) 
 
Social contract theories in Hobbes's tradition and contemporary contractualist theories 
represent a solution to the problem of coordination in political terms. Hayek vehemently 
opposes the logical fiction of the social contract and rejects the idea of an explicit rational 
agreement. Indeed, in modern society the necessity to mobilize huge amounts of information 
makes it impossible for any individual to rationally master the totality of such information: 
 
Only when it is wrongly assumed that all rules of just conduct have deliberatly been made 
by somebody do such sophisms become plausible as that all power of making laws must 
be arbitrary, or that there must always exist an ultimate 'sovereign' source of power from 
which all laws derives. (Hayek, 1973a, p. 28) 
 
Organization encounters here the problem which any attempt to bring order into complex 
human activities meets: the organizer must wish the individuals who are to co-operate to 
make use of knowledge that he himself does not possess. In none but the most simple 
kind of organization is it conceivable that all the details of all activities are governed by a 
single mind. (Hayek, 1973a, p. 49) 
 
 The advantage of achieving an equilibrium of coordination when individuals abide by 
non-explicit rules of conduct lays in the optimal utilization of fragmented knowledge allowing 
the agents to make use of, and to benefit from, more knowledge and information than is 
otherwise possible. Hence 'civilization rests on the fact that we all benefit from knowledge 
which we do not possess' (Hayek, 1973a, p 15). Accordingly, most rules of conduct, though not 
necessarily all, are observed in action without being known to the acting person in articulated or 
explicit form. Meaning that people may know how  to act, without explicitly knowing that  the 
rule is such and such, that is, the agent need not be able to state the rule in words in order to be 
able to conform to it in his actions, or to recognise whether others have or have not done so. 
And although 'man never existed without laws that he obeyed, he did, of course, exist for 
hundreds of years without laws he 'knew' in the sense that he was able to articulate them' 
(Hayek, 1973a p. 43). 
Incidentally, the notion that it is not necessary to discursivelly know a rule or a 
convention in order to behave accordingly is shared by many philosophers including, for 
instance, Lewis and Quine: 
 
It may be held that we can adopt conventions through behaviour, without first announcing 
them in words; and that we can return and formulate our conventions verbally afterward, 
if we choose, when a full language is at our disposal. It may be held that the verbal 
formulation of conventions is no more a prerequisite of the adoption of the conventions 
than the writing of a grammar is a prerequisite of speech; that explicit exposition of 
conventions is merely one of many important uses of a completed language. (W. V. 
Quine, 1963, in 1976, pp. 77-106) 
 
Unarticulated rules usually contain more than what the verbal formula succeeds in 
expressing, though articulation is often necessary. In fact, rules which govern actions of the 
members of spontaneous orders don't need to be known, or understood, by these elements as 'it 
is sufficient that the elements actually behave in a manner which can be described by such 
rules' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 43). 
Thus, in the market system we are led, for example by prices, to do things by 
circumstances of which we are largely unaware and which produce unintended results: 
 
The process of a gradual articulation in words of what had long been an established 
practice must have been a slow and complex one. The first fumbling attempts to express 
 in words what most obeyed in practice would usually not succeed in expressing only, or 
exhausting all of, what the individuals did in fact take into account in the determination of 
their actions… The process of articulation will thus sometimes in effect, though not in 
intention, produce new rules. But the articulated rules will thereby not wholly replace the 
unarticulated rules. (Hayek, 1973a, p. 78) 
 
In this sense rules of conduct take mainly the form of 'abstract principles' which apply to 
an unknown number of future instances, and equally to all persons in the objective 
circumstances described by the rule, irrespective of the effects which observance of the rule 
will produce in a particular situation. Such rules are thus 'abstract' for they are general and end-
independent rules, utterly appart from individual ends. And it is precisely the abstract nature of 
rules that allows freedom of individual decision, since freedom requires that the individual be 
allowed to pursue his own ends: 
 
What man probably found most difficult to comprehend was that the only common values 
of an open and free society were not concrete objects to be achieved, but only those 
common abstract rules of conduct that secured the constant maintenance of an equally 
abstract order which merely assured to the individual better prospects of achieving his 
individual ends but gave him no claims to particular things. (Hayek, 1979a, p. 164) 
 
Abstract rules don't pose, then, any danger to freedom as the greatest possible freedom for 
all is secured precisely 'by uniformly restricting the freedom of all by abstract rules that 
preclude arbitrary or discriminatory coercion by or of other people, that prevent any from 
invading the free sphere of any other' (Hayek, 1988, p. 63). On the other hand, in a society 
where obedience to concrete end rules is enforced by an authoritarian government individual 
freedom is annihilated, for 'individual freedom cannot be reconciled with the supremacy of one 
single purpose to which society must be entirely and permanently subordinated' (Hayek, 1944a, 
p. 206). 
These rules are also described by Hayek as negative rules in that they are 'more effective 
guides for action when they appear as no more than an unreasoned prejudice, a general feeling 
that certain things simply 'are not done, while as soon as they are explicitly stated speculation 
begins about their correctness and their validity' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 60). Such rules assure the 
individual of the right within a known domain to pursue his own goals on the basis of his own 
knowledge, and largely consist of prohibitions which warn the individual not to engage in 
certain types of actions 
  
In order to live successfully and to achieve one's aims within a world which is only 
very partiallly understood, it is therefore quite as important to obey certain inhibiting 
rules which prevent one from exposing oneself to danger as to understand the rules on 
which this world operates. Taboos or negative rules acting through the paralysing action 
of fear will, as a kind of knowledge of what not to do, constitute just as significant 
information about the environement as any positive knowledge of the attributes of the 
objects of this environment. (Hayek, 1967a, p. 81) 
 
To sum up, to follow a rule is not to follow a precise prescription, for the rules, as Hayek 
conceives them, are 'in themselves negative' 'inhibiting rules' that leave the individual free to 
pursue his goals as they just demarcate the borderlines of appropriate conduct. Indeed, their 
main characteristic is that by themselves they don't constitute the cause of a particular action, 
they don't prescribe a particular behaviour, but they delimit the conditions of certain actions and 
thus provide the framework within which inididuals may act. Such inhibitory rules eliminate 
thus certain individual choices, but at the same time as they are abstract they only delimit 
general conditions for the successful pursuit of the various individual purposes. Hence allowing 
for freedom. 
Notice also that in this sense rules are not real entities but devices which describe 
regularities of conduct2. However, as Hayek pointed out, as soon as rules of conduct are 
explicitly stated speculation begins about their correctness and their validity. This means that 
some rules of conduct are then institutionalized and codified in moral, or ultimately in legal, 
systems. This is the case of one of western civilization's oldest codes of conduct, the Ten 
Commandments, which is a code of traditional morals and consists of 'Thou shalt not' kind of 
rules. 
 
Abstract rules: rules of perception, rules of conduct and the rule of law 
Although the notion of non-explicit rule of conduct is central to Hayek's conception of 
social life, his perspective is held in place by four types of rules: rules of perception, and three 
types of rules of conduct, non-explicit rules and explicit moral rules, and legal rules. Hayek 
draws our attention to the fact that the two main types of rules should be clearly differentiated, 
but he also gives us to understand that it is not always easy to bring out the connection between 
                                                 
2  Which is also the current sociological definition. 
 the rules governing perception and the rules governing action. And a further complication is 
that his own treatment of this topic often leads to conceptual confusion as he tends to shift from 
one level to another as if the four concepts were interchangeable. I will now very briefly outline 
Hayek's main arguments on rules of perception, moral and legal rules. 
Rules governing perception are a priori  but they are not transcendental nor innate or 
genetically determined, even though the individual's genetic equipment helps him to develop 
them in the context of the environment in which he grows up. Rules governing perception have 
a common feature with rules governing action: both are rules which we cannot not state but 
nevertheless govern our actions and perceptions. Indeed, we sometimes perceive patterns which 
we are unable to specify, or that we are not able to discursively describe, and perhaps will never 
be able to specify. Furthermore, even though rules of perception are not 'negative', in keeping 
with the primacy of the abstract assumption Hayek remarks that the mind must be capable of 
performing abstract operations in order to be able to perceive particulars, and that this capacity 
appears long before we can speak of a conscious awareness of particulars : 
 
The conception that we often perceive patterns without being aware of (or even 
without perceiving at all) the elements of which they are made up conflicts with the 
deeply ingrained belief that all recognition of 'abstract' forms is 'derived' from our prior 
perception of the 'concrete': the assumption that we must first perceive particulars in all 
their richness and detail before we learn to abstract from them those features which they 
have in common with other experiences. But, although there exists some clinical evidence 
that the abstract is often dependent on the higher nervous centres and that the capacity to 
form abstarct conceptions may be lost while more concrete images are still retained, this 
is clearly not always so. Nor would it prove that the concrete is cronologically prior. 
(Hayek, 1967a, p. 52) 
 
Mental activities are thus not guided solely, or even chiefly, by the particulars towards 
which they are directed but rather by abstract rules. Hayek maintains that these rules are 
principles of perceptual organization of the same kind as, for instance, the psychological 
principles of Gestalt or in the case of linguistics, Chomsky's rules of generative grammar. 
However, in this sense principles of perceptual organization are not 'abstract' rules. Now, it is 
no coincidence that like Kant, Hayek calls these rules or principles 'schemata'. The schemata, or 
'Analogies' of experience, are held by Kant to be regulative principles of experience, since they 
are required for organizing all objects of our empirical knowledge within a cognitive unity. 
Furthermore, regulative principles which are a priori, are also called constitutive for they are 
 objectively necessary for experience. It is quite clear that Hayekian perception rules are 
equivalent to Kantian regulative principles. Moreover, by themselves the regulative principles 
do not characterize any individual item by itself but rather only in relation to other objects of 
experience. One might thus justifiably assume that when he speaks of 'abstract' perception 
rules, Hayek has in mind these feature of the regulative principles. 
If rules of perception stand at the bottom of several superimposed layers, rules in the legal 
sense stand at the top. As we have seen, rules of perception and rules of conduct are for the 
major part rules which we are able to apply without knowing them explicitly. But social life is 
also governed by rules which have been deliberatly introduced: 
 
This is necessary because those chiefly negative (or prohibitory) rules of conduct which 
make possible the formation of social order are of three different kinds, which I now spell 
out. These rules are: (I) rules that are merely observed in fact but have never been stated 
in words; if we speak of the 'sense of justice' or the 'feeling for language' we refer to such 
rules which we are able to apply, but do not know explicitly; (2) rules that, though they 
have been stated in words, still merely express approximately what has long before been 
generally observed in action; and (3) rules that have been deliberatly introduced and 
therefore necessarily exist as words set out in sentences. (Hayek, 1978, pp. 8-9) 
 
Now, Hayek insists that neither traditional nor evolved morals are a completely 
constructed and justified body of rules. Moral codes, consist, then, of abstract rules of the 
second type. Although they have been stated in words, still they merely express approximately 
what has long before been generally observed in action. 
Legal rules in the legislative sense, however, consist of rules of type 2 and 3. They have 
been deliberatly introduced, or deliberatly codified and, thereby, necessarily exist in an 
articulated form. They include, for instance, economic rules of property and contract securing 
the personal domain of the individual. Hayek claims that only minimum legal rules would allow 
for a spontaneous order to emerge and thereby, law is to consist of general rules which allow 
for the free action of individuals by limiting in general terms the range of their actions: 
 
In the terms we have adopted this means that the general rules of law that a spontaneous 
order rests on aim at an abstract order, the particular or concrete content of which is not 
known or foreseen by anyone; while the commands as well as the rules which govern an 
organization serve particular results aimed at by those who are in command of the 
organization. More complex the order aimed at, the greater will be that part of the 
separate actions which will have to be determined by circumstances not known to those 
 who direct the whole, and the more dependent control will be on rules rather than on 
specific commands. (Hayek, 1973a, p. 50) 
 
A system of private case-law governing exchange is, Hayek claims, the indispensable 
condition of individual freedom and thus provides the best framework for innovation and for 
the market order to thrive. In this sense 'the general welfare at which a government ought to aim 
cannot consist of the sum of particular satisfaction of the several individuals for the simple 
reason that neither those nor all the circumstances determining them can be known to 
government or anybody else' (Hayek, 1976a, p. 2). Thereby, legal rules do not serve particular 
ends but rather generic values: 
 
Even where the judge has to find rules which have never been stated and perhaps never 
been acted upon before, his task will thus be wholly different from that of the leader of an 
organization who has to decide what action ought to be taken in order to achieve 
particular results. (Hayek, 1973a, p. 97) 
 
Legislation, the deliberate making of law, came relatively late in the history of mankind, 
and is fraught with the most far-reaching consequences. But if legal positivism derives all law 
from the will of the legislator, Hayek's basic contention is that we could never have designed 
the whole system of legal or moral rules. 
Within the liberal framework if the market order is one side of the coin, the English 
common law is the other side. This body of general rules that was build up gradually in order to 
govern exchange is known as the English common law, whereas the economically advanced 
areas that do not have common law, take the case of Japan, have a developed system of private 
law as well. A striking example of this conception is to be found, remarked Hayek, on the one 
hand, in the doctrine of the Whigs, and on the other, in Locke, who argued that the legislators 
should make only general rules, they are to govern by promulgated established Laws, not to be 
varied in particular cases. The constructivist approach, on the other hand, is to be seen in the 
original form of legal positivism, as advocated by Thomas Hobbes and John Austin, to whom 
every law must be derivable from a conscious act of legislation. Interestingly, this constructivist 
line of thinking was later epitomized by the doctrine of Hayek's own teacher at the University 
of Vienna, Hans Kelsen, for whom Law is a deliberate construction serving particular interests. 
 In final analysis, rules are a device to cope with our constitutional ignorance in a free 
society which 'is governed by a multiplicity of individual ends which are not ordered in a 
particular hierarchy binding on the members (Hayek, 1976a, p. 15). But it is also essential to 
realise that Hayek is clearly attempting to set up a 'layered', superimposed, system of rules: 
 
I know that we both have in this connection been vainly endeavouring to find a really 
appropriate name for that stratification or layering of the structures involved which we are 
all tempted to describe as 'hierarchies'. I have throughout disregarded the fact that the 
processes I have been considering occur not just on two but on many superimposed 
layers, that therefore, for instance, I ought to have talked not only of changes in the 
dispositions to act, but also of changes in the disposition to change dispositions, and so 
on. We need a conception of tiers of networks with the highest tier as complex as the 
lower ones. What I have called abstraction is after all nothing but such a mechanism 
which designates a large class of events from which particular events are then selected 
according as they belong also to various other 'abstract' classes. (Hayek, 1978, p. 49) 
 
It is, however, to be doubted whether the several layers, and types, of rules are 
interrelated. For if it would be reasonable to assume that the various types of rules of conduct, 
moral and legal rules, which are essentially general and negative are to a certain extent 
interrelated and interdependent, it is difficult to accept that such a connection could be 
established between these rules and rules of perception. Legal and moral rules are explicit and 
enforced rules of conduct but rules of perception are of a different kind. 
 
Knowledge and coordination within the spontaneous order 
As we have seen, parallel to Hayek's claim that the basic values of an open society must 
be abstract or negative is his emphasis upon the spontaneous nature of the extended order which 
will result from certain regularities of conduct. 
The extended order self-generates when its members observe certain negative rules of 
conduct which are independent of particular purposes, and refrain from engaging in certain 
activities. Moreover, the order 'will always constitute an adaptation to the multitude of 
circumstances which are known to all the members of that society taken together but which are 
not known as a whole to any one person' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 44). The main advantage of 
spontaneous orders, such as the market process, is that they facilitate coordination through 
maximum use of widely dispersed and unsurveyable knowledge: 
 
 The order of the extended economy is, and can be, formed only by a wholly different 
process - from an evolved method of communication that makes it possible to transmit, 
not an infinite multiplicity of reports about particular facts, but merely certain abstract 
properties of several particular conditions, such as competitive prices, which must be 
brought into mutual correspondence to achieve the overall order. (Hayek, 1988, pp. 86-
87) 
 
Enabling individuals to 'judge comparative advantages of different uses of resources of 
which they have immediate knowledge and through whose use, whether they so intend or not, 
they serve the needs of distant unknown individuals' (Hayek, 1988, p. 77). 
It is essential to realise that Hayek's concern here is once again with the central issue of 
social constructivism3. He stresses that since agent's held limited knowledge they cannot 
represent the overall order nor mould their actions to it intentionally or knowingly. As the 
extended order cannot be known as a whole by anyone it is futile to try to convey integrated 
and complete information to any central authority. Accordingly, efforts to re-design 
spontaneously arisen orders are doomed to failure for such a constructivist attitude overlooks, 
on the one hand, the order's complexity and, on the other hand, the limitations of our 
knowledge and of reason in general. Indeed, as far as no one can fully comprehend its structure 
as a whole, or ascertain its particulars, no one can fully control it either. 
From all this it follows that whereas social engineering aims for particular ends, abstract 
patterns provide a framework for freedom and creativity, that is, for a free open society4. Add to 
this that there is a remarkable difference between spontaneous and designed socio-economic 
systems which lies in the mechanisms of social control. In engineered systems control consists 
in legal norms, incentives, and sanctions imposed by designated agents, while in spontaneous 
systems social control consists in abstract social and moral norms5. 
Abstract, end-independent spontaneous orders prove then, this is Hayek's point, to be 
more successful than engineered orders for the later are organizations of particular purposes, 
where rules are applicable only to particular people or in the service of the ends of the ruler. 
One might also mention, in support of the above thesis, that the whole idea of 'central control' is 
                                                 
3  Hayek's arguments against constructivism were to a large extent inspired by Hume's philosophy. 
4  The term was popularized by Karl Popper (1945), but was coined by Henri Bergson in Les deux sources de la 
morale et religion (1932). Bergson contended that the Judeo-Christian tradition has embraced in its history both 
the open society and the close society, and exhibits in its great saints an opening out of the human spirit toward all 
humanity. 
5  See also J. S. Coleman (1990). 
 not realistic6. Indeed, in the real world there is no such thing as a 'single directing mind at work; 
there will always be some council or committee charged with designing a plan of action for 
some enterprise' (Hayek, 1988, p. 87). In final analysis, then, any process of coordination 
involving groups that are not self-contained, and where different bits of information are 
contributed by different individuals, remains one of making use of dispersed knowledge. 
As is well known, Hayek borrowed his ideas on the significance of the obvious and 
simple system of natural liberty, i.e. free market system, from Adam Smith: 
 
…the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. 
Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to 
pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into 
competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely 
discharged from duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to 
innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or 
knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private 
people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the 
society. (Smith, 1776, in 1976, IV, ix, p. 687) 
 
This a very famous  and often quoted passage, and it sums up what Hayek understood by 
'socialism' and the reasons why it was doomed to failure: the undeniable assumption that no 
human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient to direct people towards the 
employments most suitable to the interest of the society. 
This said, the criticism of social constructivism shouldn't be understood as a radical anti-
rationalism disabling individuals from critical appraisal of certain patterns of the order to which 
they belong. The order's individual members are constrained merely by general rules of conduct 
and therefore they free to try alternative ways of acting and thinking. Hayekian views on 
rationalism and the possiblity for critical apparaisal of values and institutions may, at first, 
appear to conflict but by dissociating the idea of spontaneous rule from the concept of 
spontaneous order, he makes sense of the seeming contradiction between spontaneous order and 
critical rationalism. Indeed, Hayek doesn't assimilate engineering at the level of rules to 
engineering at the level of the order and he gives us to understand that the repercussions of 
intervention at the level of the rules followed by individuals are, so to speak, neutral; whereas at 
                                                 
6  Let us remember that these are the arguments that Hayek put forward when he went to explain , and elaborate 
upon the socialist problem, and the Mises-Lange debate. 
 the level of the overall order they will probably turn out as negative. To put it in different terms, 
within the Hayekian framework there's no necessary causal link between spontaneous rule and 
spontaneous order as rules are 'blind' or 'random' regarding the emerging order. Although rules 
upon which a spontaneous order rests may be of spontaneous origin, this need not always be the 
case. At the same time, some spontaneous rules governing individual behaviour may clearly 
make altogether impossible the formation of an overall spontaneous order. Regardless of its 
origins the important point is that regularities in individual's behaviour will determine the 
general character of the resulting order, but by no means all the details of its particular 
manifestations, as the order 'will always be an adaptation to a large number of particular facts 
which will not be known in their totality to anyone' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 40). 
Furthermore, it is also conceivable that the formation of spontaneous order relies entirely 
on rules that were deliberatly made: 
 
Although undoubtedly an order originally formed itself spontaneously because the 
individuals followed rules which had not been deliberatly made but had arisen 
spontaneously, people gradually learned to improve those rules…That even an order 
which rests on made rules may be spontaneous in character is shown by the fact that its 
particular manifestation will always depend on many circumstances which the designer of 
these rules did not and could not know. (Hayek, 1973a, pp. 45-6) 
 
What is more, within the Hayekian world view the market system, or catallaxy, is seen as 
the most comprehensive order extending over the various fields of society7. All in all, the 
market order is presented as a highly complex and non-representable system of general, end-
independent, rules. We'can preserve an order of such complexity not by the method of directing 
the members, but only indirectly by enforcing and improving the rules conducive to the 
formation of a spontaneous order' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 51). 
Now, it is important to distinguish carefully between the abstract spontaneous order and 
the concrete order made of human beings and the institutions that they set up. In the latter 
individuals draw upon practical knowledge entailing skills and habits. The abstract order, 
however, emerges unintentionally out of the interactions of a myriad of individuals acting 
within particular circumstances, but it is highly complex and evades individual knowledge. As 
                                                 
7  This prompted some to note that this 'economic' conception of reality, resembles the perspective that was shared 
by Marx  as well. 
 we cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, the abstract spontaneous order we are only 
able to reconstruct it mentally by tracing the relations that exist between its elements. Still, the 
two orders interact leading to a reciprocal determination 
 
The methodology of social science 
Based on the foregoing discussion, namely the acceptance that the social realm is 
structured by rules, as opposed to concept-dependent, I will now raise the question of the 
significance of this transformation in terms of the methodology social science, whose main task 
is to explain the formation and evolution of the socio-economic order and its institutions. 
Hayek's account of social analysis is thus related to his conception of social life as the 
unintended result of individuals's interaction, since in the market place as in other institutions of 
the catallaxy the result of individuals's actions has unintended consequences within a context 
which includes internal and external, acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions. Social 
science, then, 'begins with-and has an object only because of-the discovery that there exist 
orderly structures which are the product of the action of many men but not the result of human 
design' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 37). Orderly structures, however, are the result of regularities of 
individual conduct and, therefore, to reconstruct the spontaneous orders it is necessary to 
explain social action from within the rules which give it meaning8: 
 
Yet, though the whole economic theory (and, I believe, of linguistic theory) may be 
interpreted as nothing else but an endeavour to reconstruct from regularities of the 
individual actions the character of the resulting order, it can hardly be said that 
economists are fully aware that this is what they are doing. The nature of different kinds 
of rules of individual conduct (some voluntarily or even unconsciously observed and 
some enforced), which the formation of the order presupposes, is frequently left obscure. 
(Hayek, 1967a, p. 72) 
 
Given the acknowledgement that there is an element of non-discursive rule reliance in all 
our thinking and action, social analysis is given the task of identifying those rules and of 
conceptualizing the connections between them providing us with a glimpse of the overall 
                                                 
8  It is interesting to consider that Hayek's position here bears a striking similarity with that of Searle: 
 
Sometimes in order to explain adequately a piece of human behavior we have to suppose that it was done in 
accordance with a rule, even though the agent himself may not be able to satate the rule and may not even be 
conscious of the fact that he is acting in accordance with the rule. (J. R. Searle, 1969, p. 42) 
 pattern although it will never allow us to ompletely grasp, or otherwise totally reconstruct, the 
overall spontaneous order. The imperative of the 'Scientism' essay was to understand social 
action from within the mind of each acting individual. But with the recognition that individuals 
are unable to conceptualize all the conditions of their actions, the 'subjective' approach to social 
reality with its explanations that rely exclusively on motivating ideas cannot provide us with an 
adequate account of social life. Indeed, since the individuals need not be able to state rules in 
words in order to be able to conform to them it is useless to hook exclusively into the self-
understanding that agents have of their actions. Social agents may 'know how' to act, and the 
manner of their action may be correctly described by an articulated rule, without their explicitly 
'knowing that' the rule is such and such. The point to be emphasised is, then, that a rule may 
effectuvely govern action in the sense that from knowing it the social scientist can explain 
people's behaviour, without it being known as a verbal formula to the actors. In other words, 
this is a perennial issue within social analysis, the distinction between the meaning of an action 
and what the actor means by it: 
 
To the observer the norms guiding the actions of the individuals in a group are part of the 
determinants of the events which he perceives and which enable him to explain the 
overall order of actions as he finds it. 
 (Hayek, 1973a, pp. 79-80) 
 
Let us also remember that those chiefly negative rules of conduct which make possible 
the formation of the concrete and the abstract order are of different kinds. Indeed some rules are 
unknown to the acting individuals whilst others that have been deliberatly introduced and 
therefore necessarily exist as words set out in sentences. The explanatory task is, then, not only 
to identify rules which are operative on certain occasions, but also to determine conjectural 
connections between networks of rules and thus provide us with a glimpse of the overall pattern 
inspite of the fact that the acting persons may not be aware of it. Indeed, 'though social theory 
constructs social orders from the rules of conduct assumed to be given at any one time, these 
rules of conduct have themselves developed as a part of a larger whole' (Hayek, 1967a, p. 73). 
However, a further complication is that connections of this kind are not likely to be understood 
'until we have learnt to distinguish clearly between the regularities of individual conduct which 
are defined by rules and the overall order which will result from the observance of certain kinds 
 of rules' (Hayek, 1973a, p. 111). Indeed, since we cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, 
the abstract order of meaningful actions, we are only able to reconstruct it mentally by tracing 
the relations that exist between its elements. It is worth stating at this point that even though 
Hayek did not explicitly acknowledge the two distinct levels of the order, the tacit acceptance 
of such an hierarchy underlies all of his methodological propositions. Obviously, different 
social sciences target mainly elements of one level or the other, jurisprudence for instance 
targets mainly the concrete level while systems theory targets the abstarct order, although most 
social sciences target both the concrete and the abstract levels: 
 
I must confess here that, however grateful we all must be for some of the descriptive 
work of the sociologists, for which, however, perhaps anthropologists and historians 
would have been equally qualified, there seems to me still to exist no more justification 
for a theoretical discipline of sociology than there would be for a theoretical discipline of 
naturology apart from the theoretical disciplines dealing with particular classes of natural 
or social phenomena. (Hayek, 1979a, p. 173) 
 
Now, in order to understand the formation of the order of human interaction a 'genetic' 
account comes to play a prominent part while tracing connections between networks of rules. 
This genetic methodology proceeds by rationally reconstructing, though only partially, the 
process of formation of our traditions and institutions This, however, excludes one-directional 
causation and mechanical laws. Hayek's account of self-ordering processes is thus mainly 
descriptive9 and, as he would have us believe, economic science is the only science to have 
developed a theoretical technique for dealing with such spontaneous orders: 
 
At this point I find myself in the embarrassing position of wanting to claim that it must be 
the members of my own profession, the economists, specialists who understand the 
process of formation of extended orders, who are most likely to be able to provide 
explanationsof those moral traditions that made the growth of civilization possible. Only 
someone who can account for effects such as those connected with several property can 
explain why this type of practice enabled those groups following it to outstrip others 
whose morals were better suited to the achievment of different aims. (Hayek, 1988, p. 70) 
 
In general terms Hayek follows here the path taken by Menger, who attempted to provide 
a 'genetic' rational reconstruction of economic phenomena through a method of conjectural 
 history10. Let us be clear, however, that Menger's historical account which is 'compositive', 
aims at reconstructing social 'wholes' from their parts and is a purely rational a priori  
assessment which excludes empirical testing. A procedure which Hayek advocated in the 
'Scientism' essay but which was not followed in subsequent work. Although it is not the place 
to discuss Hayek's cultural evolution theory, let me just point out that one of the obvious 
reasons for this transformation is surely that a strictly subjectivist compositive method doesn't 
help us shed light on the question of why some rules rather than others prevailed as the product 
of cultural selection, since it cannot provide us with an explanation for the evolutionary process 
which doesn't depend upon the agents beliefs. 
Now, the point at issue is that inspite of the fact that, in earlier works, Hayek had held 
that the only empirical part of social science, i.e. economics, concerns the acquisition of 
knowledge, this new line of thinking and the acknowledgement that the empirical conditions in 
which socio-economic events occur are also relevant to the explanation of those events 
certainly has far-reaching implications for social methodology. On these new grounds, the 
assessment of factual circumstances which lead individuals to behave in such ways as to bring 
about the observed social regularities should also be 1) accounted for, and 2) tested. 
Within this framework, intelligibility of human actions depends upon the identification of 
the rules which are necessary to classify actions of being of a certain kind conjoined with an 
assessment of the conditions that provide the basis upon which those actions are performed. 
Including acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions, internal non-discursive and tacit 
motivations, and external material requirements: 
 
The concrete individual action will always be the joint effect of internal impulses, such 
as hunger, the particular external events acting upon the individual (including the actions 
of other members of the group) and the rules applicable to the situation thus determined. 
The rules upon which different individual members of a group will at any moment act 
may therefore be different either because the drives or external circumstances acting upon 
                                                                                                                                                           
9  It must be pointed out that Hayek's terminology is confusing. He dismisses explanation in favour of description, 
but at times he seems to accept some type of explanation as well. 
10  In the debate whith the positivist-empiricist historical school which hoped to arrive at the laws of development 
of social wholes, Menger argued against the use of history as a means of discovering empirical laws and 
emphasized that the object of social theory is the tracing of the unintended consequences of individual actions, and 
that in this effort the genetic and functional aspects cannot be separated. It is essential to realise, however, that 
Menger's 'genetic' account of the formation of social institutions is still an historical rather than, strictly speaking, 
an evolutionary assessment of a process of social reproduction driven by a selective mechanism. For more see 
Hayek (1934c, 1968b, 1968c). 
 them make different rules applicable, or because different rules apply to different 
individuals according to age, sex, status, or some particular state in which each individual 
finds himself at the moment. (Hayek, 1967a, p. 68) 
 
The provisional hypothesis about a process which might have taken place are susceptible 
of undergoing experimental testing. Nonetheless, it must also be emphasized that Hayek was 
also extremely cautious about the possibility of empirical cheks, to the best of my knowledge 
there is only one brief passage in the 'Studies' where he openly advocated testability: 
 
Yet the problem of the formation of such structure is still a theoretical and not a 
historical problem, because it is concerned with those factors in a sequence of events 
which are in principle repeatable, though in fact they may have occurred only 
once…Conjectural history in this sense is the reconstruction of a hypothetical kind of 
process which may never have been observed but which, if it had taken place, would have 
produced phenomena of the kind we observe. The assumption that such a process has 
taken place may be tested by seeking for yet unobservable consequences which follow 
from it, and by asking whether all regular structures of the kind in question which we find 
can be accounted for by that assumption. (Hayek, 1967a, p. 75)) 
 
Now, given Hayek's dismissal of the traditional empiricist principle of induction, this 
kind of limited testing cannot provide a basis on which to confirm a scientific theory nor does it 
allow for the establishment of predictive inferences. Indeed, his point is that complex 
phenomena cannot be made completely rational or subject to 'control'. From all this it follows 
that in relation to the complex phenomena of the social sciences we can only attain 'qualitative' 
understanding, and not exact prediction11. Complex phenomena are thus confined to pattern 
prediction, or prediction in 'principle': 
 
With respect to policy, the methodological insight that in the case of complex 
spontaneous orders we will never be able to determine more than the general principles 
on which they operate or to predict the particular changes that any event in the 
environment will bring about, has far-reaching consequences. (Hayek, 1973a, pp. 62-63) 
 
All in all, the social scientist can only gain a partial insight into the character of the 
spontaneous order and, therefore, he cannot pretend to be able to fully grasp the mechanism 
which brings about and maintains the structure of the order. From his schematic picture of the 
 order he is unable to foresee all the particulars of a concrete situation, nor explain why or how it 
occurred or predict its future transformations. Although Hayek didn't argue for an idealistic nor 
for an a prioristic  approach, he stressed that given the limits of guidance by factual knowledge 
it is useless to focus on random experimentation. As a consequence, even though empirical 
assessment is allowed, it is assigned a limited role within the analysis of self-ordering 
processes. 
 
Hayek and the Austrian School of Economics  
It is a commomplace to observe that Hayek's social analysis and his arguments against 
central planning were construed under the heading of the Austrian subjectivist premise. Based 
on the undergoing discussion I want to argue that the latter did not play a crucial role in the 
development of the later stages of Hayek's social theorizing, and that indeed it would be more 
accurate to say that his mature conceptual framework is rather at odds not only with mainstream 
Austrian a priorism. but with radical subjectivism as well. Actually some commentators, such 
as Bruce Caldwell, rightly underscored that Hayek never endorsed Misesian a priorism  but the 
practical aspect of the Hayekian concept of knowledge and the empirical level of the 
spontaneous order are seldom acknowledged. In what follows I want to discuss the topics of 
Austrian a priorism  and subjectivism, and raise the question of the significance of Hayek's 
position in view of the socialist problem. Hayekian thinking, of course, was informed by 
fundamental features of the school's doctrine, namely, the opposition to neo-positivism, the idea 
that social phenomena are the unintended result of human efforts, and the notion that 
information held by individuals is the key to economic and social understanding. However, as 
Hayek went on to elaborate upon and extend these insights, he gradually moved away from the 
school's strictly subjectivist approach and at the same time developed a conceptual framework 
which enabled him to argue successfully against socialism. 
In order to clear the ground, let us remember that social phenomena such as economic and 
political arrangements are seen by Hayek, and by all Austrians, as being in a sense too 
'complex' to be theorized about. As Hayek puts it, the main achievement of the Austrian school 
of Economics is precisely the fact of having highlighted that all social and economic formations 
                                                                                                                                                           
11  Hayek wrongly believes that this is a situation exclusively prevalent in the field of social science. However, 
prediction and control are also impossible, for instance, in biology. 
 are complex by nature. As we have seen, Hayek went on to extend this insight and 
demonstrated that acting individuals only possess partial knowledge, but the resulting order of 
collective phenomena incorporate all the relevant data, or information, available to all agents : 
 
The main achievement of the Austrian school's thereby became that it decidedly helped to 
clear up the differences that must inevitably exist among disciplines that deal with 
relatively simple phenomena, like mechanisms, which necessarily were the first to be 
very successful and which for this reason came to be regarded as paradigms that other 
disciplines ought to imitate, and the sciences of highly complex phenomena, or of 
structures determined by a greater number of particular facts than could ever be 
concretely ascertained by scientific observers and containing objects of theoretical (rather 
than physically observable) thought - i.e., the thoughts of other persons. What had already 
been implicit in Adam's Smith conception of the "invisible hand", which led to the 
formation of an order that no individuals in the society could understand, in this way 
became the prototype of the model on which an increasing number of attempts are based 
to master the problems of determining highly complex orders. (Hayek, 1968b, in 1992, p. 
56) 
 
The key to economic understanding is thus the emphasis placed on informational 
contents, a postulate which in Menger's Grundsätze  der Volkswirtschaftslehre  (1871) 
translates into the theory of subjective value according to which one of the prerequisites for 'a 
thing to become a good' is human knowledge of the causal connection between satisfaction and 
need. As it is well known, the Austrian school was philosophically influenced by neo-
Kantianism and advocated a true a priori  economic theory. It is interesting to consider Carl 
Menger's claim that testing the exact theory of the economy through full experience is just a 
methodological absurdity, and the following statement which goes as far as to compare 
economic theory with mathematics: 
 
To want to test the pure theory of economy by experience in its full reality is a process 
analogous to that of the mathematician who wants to correct the principles of geometry 
by measuring real objects, without reflecting that the latter are indeed not identical with 
the magnitudes which pure geometry presumes or that every measurement of necessity 
implies elements of inexactitude… The results of realistic orientation stand in an 
essentially different relationship to the empirical method than those of exact research. The 
former are based, of course, on the observation of phenomena in their "empirical reality" 
and complexity, and of course the criterion of their truth is accordingly the empirical 
 method. An empirical law lacks the guarantee of absolute validity a priori, i.e., simply 
according to its methodological presuppositions. (Menger, 1883, in 1963, pp. 69-70)12 
 
Ironically, this exclusive dichotomy between, on the one hand, a pure subjective 
rationality and, on the other hand, the realm of empirical phenomena, is even more so 
reminiscent of Cartesian dualism than of Kantian a priorism. 
Ludwig von Mises is the one who most forcefully put the case for an a prioristic  
approach and his position surely has far-reaching implications. His main methodological idea is 
that economics is a praxiology, a general theory of action, revolving around the rationality 
postulate, or more precisely, a subjective and a priori  science of every kind of human action. 
Accordingly, all rationality is subjective and every '[a]ction is, by definition, always rational' 
(Mises, 1962, p. 35). Consequently, economic theory should be regarded as 'pure theory', that 
is, unconnected with empirical data although referring to concrete action. Mises, who regarded 
disdainfully empirical research, pointed out that: 
 
The theorems attained by correct praxiological reasoning are not only perfectly certain 
and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover with the 
full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability, to the reality of action as it 
appears in life and history. Praxiology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real 
things. (L. von Mises, 1949, p. 39) 
 
This is an important and revealing remark. Indeed, if praxiology is a science of the same 
kind as geometry or logic it means that it has no connection with the real world were economic 
systems are confronted with all sort of factual circumstances. Now, a serious criticism directed 
against this line of thinking, revealing the difficulties about supporting this kind of views, is 
that its a priorism  hampers any serious research project13. In view of such criticism it is, then, 
essential to realise that if in general terms Hayek adhered to the school's doctrine, he didn't 
adopt the a priorist  approach characteristic of Austrian economics. 
To quote Caldwell : 
 
                                                 
12 It would appear that Menger mistakenly takes 'theoretical', 'formal', a priori , as interchangeable concepts. This 
means that not only did he claim that only abstraction can reach the reality underneath economic phenomena. But 
he regarded economic theory as a priori  and thereby imune to data. 
13 See, for example, M. Bunge (1998). 
 Mises, like Popper, started from Weber and eventually produced a logic of choice, though 
their versions of it could not have been more different. One reason that Hayek may have 
avoided the topic initially was that he did not want to have to confront Mises, with whose 
a priorism  he apparently disagreed. Later on he may not have wanted to have to choose 
between them. In any event, since Hayek never explored the logic of choice, in this matter 
Mises and Popper, the a priorist  and the falsificationist, shared more in common with 
one another than they did with Hayek. (Caldwell, 1994, p. 128)14 
 
As mentioned above, blunt criticism pertaining to Hayek's supposedly a prioristic  
conceptual framework is thus unjustified, even though it is certainly true that in another sense 
Hayek had started in philosophy from a neo-Kantian viewpoint and accordingly the 
philosophical assumptions underlying his economic and social theorizing were influenced by 
such a line of thinking. 
As Hayek was trying to set up a case against central planning and socialism, following the 
Mises-Lange debate in the 1930s the problems of knowledge and change came to play a 
prominent part in the shaping of his arguments.15. Indeed, let us remember that since the very 
                                                 
14  It is worth noting that Caldwell had previously (1988a) claimed that Popper was a Hayekian since his 
situational analysis was a generalization of the methodology of economics so that it would be fair enough to 
presume that he got it from Hayek. But he was quick to amend his former position as he went on to point out that 
Popper's situational logic method owes much more to Weber than it does to Hayek. I agree with this later 
assessment. 
Game theory, for instance, derives directly from logic of choice. Although Hayek never openly criticized it, it is a 
tool incompatible with his assumptions regarding knowledge. Indeed, Game Theory abstracts from the tangles of 
the social world to a pure realm peopled by ideally rational agents equiped with fully ordered preferences and 
complete information. Moreover, it was invented at the Austrian Business Cycle Institute which was set up with 
Mises's help in 1927, after being persuaded by Hayek following his visit to the U.S. in 1924. Hayek became the 
first director of the new institute where he worked with Oskar Morgenstern, who succeeded him when he left for 
London in 1931. The line of research of the institute became then increasingly scientific, focussing on 
mathematical and econometric approaches, and within this framework mathematician John von Newman 
contributed to the invention of Game Theory in the early 1940s. Hayek though, was opposed to the econometric 
framework, and he strongly criticized mathematical economics. 
15  As mentioned above, following the Mises-Lange controversy over socialism, and the fact that Mises's (1920, 
1922) definition of socialism was not efficient, after 1944 Hayek will attack central planning not only in economic, 
but also in political and philosophical terms. Mises argued that socialism, or for that matter every kind of economic 
planning by the government, could not work because it lacked the information of market prices. As underlined by 
Streissler (1994), Mises had borrowed the core of this idea from Friedrich von Wieser, Hayek's teacher, who was 
the first to argue that even a socialist community would have to calculate in economic terms in order to be 
efficient. However, even though Mises had found an important problem and the line of solution, he could not 
prove his solution. As K. Vaughn suggestively highlighted: 
 
Mises wrote an article claiming that rational economic calculation was impossible under socialism. This 
prompted those who favoured socialism to try to refute him and thus forced them to construct a model of (a) 
rationally administered centrally directed economy. Meanwhile, Hayek wrote two sophisticated and penetrating 
critiques of the socialist schemes which were in the main ignored. Mises seemed easy to refute, and so, for 
twenty years, socialists continued to refute the same arguments, thereby avoiding consideration of the more 
difficult issues raised by Hayek. (K. Vaughn, 1980, p. 537). 
 begining Hayek dismissed the mainstream concept of equilibrium16 precisely because it 
focussed on perfect competition and, thereby, ignored the complex, real world of imperfection 
and continuous and unpredictable change. The notion of practical knowledge put forward in the 
essay of 1945a conjoined with the theory of the spontaneous order, systematized between the 
mid-60s and the late-70s, which comprises both a concrete and an abstract level and is 
structured by general rules which are followed tacitly, is the keystone of the arch in the 
architectonic of the arguments against central planning. These arguments are thus couched in 
the real world where the knowledge upon which socio-economic life depends is not only 
divided amongst a myriad of agents, but in reality is also usually not available to the discursive 
awareness of the acting individuals. Thus, in the market system we are led, for instance by 
prices, to do things by circumstances of which we are largely unaware and which produces 
unintended results. The practical, tacit, knowledge embeded in social practices and 
encapsulated in prices is first and foremost the knowledge of particular circumstances and, 
therefore, is constantly changing along with whatever changes occur in society. As a 
consequence, it cannot be encompassed by isolate individuals or even by a group of 
government officials, hence it cannot be conveyed to any central authority in a statistical form. 
As highlighted by Moldofsky: 
 
For, as Professor Hayek argues, no one can convey to planning authorities the required 
knowledge because no one knows, or can know, beforehand which of the many particular 
facts might be important to them at the time in question. Therefore, the more complex the 
economic system, the more deficient is the knowledge of the central planners, and the 
greater is the need for competitive markets and the prices they generate. (Naomi 
Moldofsky, 1989, p. 16) 
 
Hayek's challenge to the possibility of successful central planning focussed,then, on 
epistemological arguments pertaining to the limitations of our reason and to the nature of the 
ever changing economic knowledge, rather than on the Austrian subjectivist premise. 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
In any event, Mises emphasized the theoretical impossibility and argued against the economic workability of 
socialism, whilst Hayek underlined the aspect of practicality. But as a matter of fact, efficient socialist systems do 
exist, and Hayek underlined that although socialist systems are possible, in the sense of being economically 
eficient, they are extremely impracticable, and too costly, but the competitive market collects information very 
cheaply. 
For more see T. W. Hutchison (1981), F. Machlup (1981), and I. Kirzner (1986). 
16  See, for instance, B. Caldwell (1988a, 1988b). 
 According to the latter, the central bureau can never plan for individual wants because it cannot 
know them. Meaning that the individual alone knows about his subjective evaluations. For 
Hayek though, the individual itself is basically ignorant and he lacks information about the 
circumstances and conditions around him, about the rules governing his actions. 
As Streissler has so aptly put it: 
 
Now if the individual alone knows about his subjective evaluations of goods, this might 
imply that government can never plan for individual wants, because it cannot know them. 
Once more, however, this is a point subtly different from that made by Hayek: with 
Hayek it is a lack of information of the central agency about what the individual knows 
concerning other agents, their actions, concerning circumstances and conditions around 
him etc., but not a lack of information about individual evaluations. It may be that to 
Menger his subjectivist position was so important because it did argue against 'socialism'; 
but this point is not the main point in Hayek. (E. Streissler, 1994, p. 53) 
 
Consider the following statement: 
 
…Hayek (as well as all later Austrians, to varying degrees) endorsed at least one crucial 
Misesian methodological position, namely, the belief that subjectivism must play a 
central role in analysing the behaviour of agents. But as far as his a priorism  is 
concerned, it is incorrect to think that Hayek once followed Mises, then, changed course 
sometime in the 1930s. (B. J. Caldwell, 1994, p. 121) 
 
Indeed, subjectivism plays a role within the Hayekian framework. However, let me point 
out that in later work Hayek acknowledges that agents are unable to conceptualize all the 
conditions of their actions and that the social order exists, at least to some extent, independently 
of the knowledge that agents have of it. Accordingly the analysis of the behaviour of agents in 
terms of non-discursive rule-following replaces the previous framework which focussed 
exclusively on individual conceptions. This rule-following framework will also play a pivotal 
role in the challenge to socialism. As we have seen, as Hayek presents us with a spontaneous 
order structured by abstract rules he draws our attention that at a political level the fact that 
these rules are also an ideal means of coordination and, given their general nature, they leave 
the individual free to pursue his goals. 
In later work, Hayek didn't focus on the implications of the extension of Austrian 
subjectivism. However, over and above all these considerations, there is a 'decided family 
likeness between the informational arguments of Menger and Hayek. And how could it be 
 otherwise…Hayek, of course, was also the rediscoverer of the half-forgotten Carl Menger' 
(Streissler, 1994, p. 54). Indeed Hayek, who belonged to the third generation of Austrian 
economists, always stressed his allegiance to the school. However, if in earlier work, namely in 
the 'Scientism' essay which strikes a radical subjectivist note, Hayek's standpoint is typically 
Austrian, in later work his position is significantly different from that of mainstream members 
of the school. Inspite of the fact that Hayek never acknowledged the existence of any implicit 
dissension and that, on the contrary, he kept stressing his indebtedness to the tradition of 
Austrian economics17. 
 
Conclusion 
Hayek's earlier radical subjectivism patent in the 'Scientism' essay represented only a 
stage on the course of his understanding of the problems of the economic, political and social 
orders. Indeed, as Hayek went on to elaborate upon and extend his insights on knowledge he 
moved away from the Austrian school's a prioristic  and strictly subjectivist line of thinking, 
and developed a conceptual framework which enabled him to argue successfully against 
socialism. At the heart of his social theorizing lies an innovative conception of the spontaneous 
order as constantly confronted by the all pervasive problems of knowledge and change, 
comprising both an abstract and a concrete level. On the one hand, the concrete level of the 
order is made up of individuals drawing upon practical knowledge concerning concrete 
situations of time and place, and which never exists in an articulated or integrated form. On the 
other hand, the abstract level is a highly complex non-representable system which is not known 
as a whole to any person. Given the huge amounts of information involved at the two levels, the 
overall order is too complex to be managed and we can only partially reconstruct it 
conceptually. In this sense Hayek's suspicion of empiricism and his belief in our inability to 
explain, control, or re-design the complex order reflects the somewhat enduring influence of the 
Austrian tradition in the shaping of his thinking. 
 
                                                 
17  Caldwell (1994) observed with much truth that Hayek was careful never to criticize Mises's methodological 
views directly while Mises was alive. A pattern which, of course, he also followed with regards to Popper. But in 
1968b, for example, Hayek remarked that, as opposed to the earlier Austrians, Mises's was in fact a strictly 
rationalist utilitarian. Furthermore, as Hayek pointed out, since the term Austrian school was for many years 
synonimous with Mises's disciples, his 'extreme position' against scientism contributed to the relative unpopularity 
of the school in the United States. 
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